

The Times

November 2005

A journal of transport timetable history and analysis



PRIVATE
FOR THE USE OF RAILWAY OFFICERS AND SERVANTS ONLY

NEW SOUTH WALES
GREAT SOUTHERN AND
WESTERN RAILWAYS

WORKING TIME-TABLE

OF
PASSENGER, LIVE STOCK, GOODS
AND MINERAL TRAINS,

TO COME INTO OPERATION ON
4th MARCH, 1885,
AND UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE

TIMETABLES OF A PREVIOUS DATE ARE NO LONGER IN FORCE

Every Officer and Servant must make himself conversant with this Table, in order that he may be thoroughly acquainted with all Alterations that may have been made. Any inaccuracies must be immediately reported to the Traffic Manager, and the Staff are invited to communicate to the Inspectors of their districts any alterations which they consider desirable in the running of the trains. Communications respecting alterations must reach the Traffic Managers not later than the morning of the 15th of each month.

The Rules and Regulations now in force are dated 20th January 1885

No Train may be allowed to depart from any station before the appointed time.
After sunset, unless otherwise specially ordered, all the lights on the rails must be shown, and the signal box, or light box, or any other apparatus, immediately under the same, as well as the lights on the rails, must be shown in the usual manner, or as directed by the Traffic Manager.
The number of the train, or the number of the goods or mineral train, must be shown on the signal box, or light box, or any other apparatus, immediately under the same, as well as the lights on the rails, must be shown in the usual manner, or as directed by the Traffic Manager.
If a train is to stop at any station, the passenger must be notified by the signal box, or light box, or any other apparatus, immediately under the same, as well as the lights on the rails, must be shown in the usual manner, or as directed by the Traffic Manager.
If a train is to stop at any station, the passenger must be notified by the signal box, or light box, or any other apparatus, immediately under the same, as well as the lights on the rails, must be shown in the usual manner, or as directed by the Traffic Manager.
When trains are running in two directions, the first train must stop at Station, Stop, or Platform, as directed by the Traffic Manager.

W. V. READ
Traffic Manager

SYDNEY, THOMAS RICHARDS, GOVERNMENT PRINTER.—1885

FROM 1st DECEMBER, 1896.

**NEW SOUTH WALES
RAILWAYS**

**TIME TABLE AND
GENERAL INFORMATION**

75 0003 96

From 2nd DECEMBER, 1917

**NEW SOUTH WALES
RAILWAYS**

TIME TABLES — 3d

FARES AND GENERAL INFORMATION

PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY OF THE RAILWAY COMMISSIONERS.
*15714
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FROM 6th NOVEMBER, 1934.
(Revised fortnightly afterwards up to 2nd July, 1938.)

TIME TABLE

DEPARTMENT OF RAILWAYS
NEW SOUTH WALES

COUNTRY SERVICES

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COUNTRYLINK AND
CITY RAIL
WESTERN
REGION

TRAIN CONNECTIONS

EXPIRES 10th APRIL 1942

CountryLink
Fares and Timetables, Rail and Coach Services.
Valid from 25 June 2002

NEW Broken Hill daylight rail service
Starts 25 June 2002

New South Wales
Canberra
Melbourne
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Inside: Australian Dog's Breakfast—the devolution of the timetable in Australia RRP \$2.95 Incl. GST

The Times

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—Contents—

Australian Dog's Breakfast (concluded)

3

On the front cover

In New South Wales, we have had train timetables for 150 years and one month. The first timetable handbills were handed out on opening day in late September 1855, but none seem to have survived. For most of the succeeding 150 years, the organisation that ran the trains also compiled and printed the timetables, but this is no longer true. In this issue, we conclude our year-long analysis of the changes that have taken place in the timetable world, with a particular focus on NSW and Victoria, because they illustrate best what a drastic change it has been. As with the rest of the planet, the changes that have taken place in this country are entirely changes of the last 10 years, overturning nearly a century and a half of timeless practice. Our cover shows some randomly-sampled Public rail Timetables from NSW, ranging from the 1890s to the new millenium.

The article which fills this issue details rapid changes in timetabling practice in Australia. Change has been so rapid that what was true when the series commenced is no longer true today. The article—and the series—has largely focussed on the Track Owners, because it is they who determine the timetables. We have pretty much ignored Train Operators—because they have to take what the Track Owners dole out. But the way Train Operators operate necessarily has an effect on what Track Owners *can* dole out and. In this respect, 2005 has probably seen as many or more important changes driven by the Train Operators than by the Track Owners. Prime among these is Pacific National, which got its foot in the door for NSW coal haulage and intermodal traffic on the previously sacrosanct QR system. It is also threatening to tear itself apart, possibly leading to 2 or more major Train Operators who may end up competing for the favours of the Track Owners. And, in Tasmania, where it *is* the Track Owner, Pacific National has announced that it wishes to shut down the entire system, apart from minerals and cement haulage. This may lead to a State without timetables and perhaps without trains. A Dog's Breakfast indeed.

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The Times

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Australian Dog's Breakfast

In the final installment of *Timetabling Revolution*, the Australian train timetabling world is reviewed by **GEOFF LAMBERT**

Even after National Competition Policy (NCP) was fully implemented across the country, timetabling and operations continued to be fenced off by state boundaries. The extent of this can be seen in the table on pages 12-13, which looks at train planning and timetabling through the prisms of geographical segmentation, vertical and horizontal separation and train timetabling. For this reason, the analyses of train planning which follow are also segregated on a geographical basis.

In the table are estimates of the amount of traffic handled under each access regime and by each operator, with a concentration on number of trains operated per week. This interesting statistic is probably the most illustrative of the timetabling task which operators face- but it is very hard to come by. The numbers shown there have been compiled from a number of sources, including the WTTs, Key Performance Indicator reports, transport statistics databases, operator web-sites and anecdotal information found in a range of publications such as submissions to enquiries. The data is nevertheless very incomplete.

The bulk of the text and table refers to train planning in the post-NCP era. However, in some states, the goal posts were significantly moved while the process proceeded and this led to essentially different regimes. In NSW there have been 4 distinct scenarios, which are dealt with serially. Metropolitan and country networks are also usually treated separately, even when the infrastructure owner and the train operator is the one organisation. Although there is debate about whether NCP can or should apply to private lines such as those in the Pilbara, and although these lines have been the subjects of legal challenges for access rights, they are not dealt with at all.

ARTC

While Australian National was being readied for privatisation and to accommodate the open access requirements of competition policy and as a forerunner to privatisa-

tion, a separate business unit known as ANR Track Access was set up within ANR to administer access to its interstate track. This entity, which was not vertically separate from ANR, became responsible for timetabling.

With the sale of AN completed in November 1997, the 'below rail' infrastructure (the land on which the rails were laid) in Tasmania and of the intrastate lines in South Australia were returned to the State Governments, who in turn leased them to the new infrastructure managers. In these two cases, the infrastructure manager was also the principal train operator on the system. How these entities did their train planning is discussed under the relevant state headings.

The first private rail operator to gain access to the interstate network was Specialised Container Transport which started a Melbourne to Perth freight service in July 1995. To achieve this, SCT had to have access agreements in place with AN Track Access, Public Transport Commission (Victoria) and Westrail. The timetable for this train is shown on the back cover.

ARTC itself sprang fully-formed from the loins of the Australian Government- there was no specific legislative instrument for it. Governments have given themselves power to set up their own companies without recourse to legislation and these powers were used to create ARTC in February 1998 following the November 1997 Inter Governmental Agreement (IGA). ARTC has only 2 dividend-receiving shareholders both of whom are Federal Government Ministers (Finance and Administration; Transport and Regional Services). The effective commencement of ARTC operations occurred on 1 July 1998. On this date, the Ministers transferred ANR Track Access and its interstate rail corridors and infrastructure, other assets, specified liabilities and contractual rights and obligations to ARTC. ARTC subsequently leased the main line standard gauge tracks in Victoria, linking Serviceton with Albury.

ARTC operates as a rail access pro-



New day dawns for ARTC. When ARTC came into being, so did Australia's first-ever seamless trans-continental train timetable- well, almost.

vider and a rail infrastructure manager. The company's main responsibilities include the provision of equitable access arrangements to the rail network it manages, the provision of train path planning services, the provision of a train control function for all trains operating over the network, infrastructure construction, management and maintenance. Since 2004, ARTC has also leased those sections of the NSW Network identified by the 1997 IGA as parts of the 'defined interstate network'.

ARTC's timetabling bods came from ANR Track Access and its approach to timetabling has therefore initially followed ANR practice. Since ARTC was, in a sense what the Government was wont to call a 'lighthouse project', it could hardly help but try to fulfil all the precepts of the National Competition policy. Thus, it is a quite open organisation to Access Seekers and provides them with far more than normal. ARTC has drawn up an Access Undertaking containing detailed terms and conditions. This

CityRail operated the suburban and intercity passenger train services throughout Sydney, as well as in Wollongong, Newcastle, the Southern Highlands and west across the Blue Mountains as far as Lithgow. It maintained 1,700 kilometres of electrified track and its associated infrastructure and 60 kilometres of non-electrified track. It was responsible for timetabling (including some aspects of FreightRail and CountryLink services within its jurisdiction), train control and signalling functions covering the metropolitan area.

CountryLink operated long distance passenger services to intra-state and interstate destinations and drew up the timetables for them and published them independently. **FreightRail** operated freight services. It maintained 7,469 kilometres of track and infrastructure outside the metropolitan area, as well as major freight terminals in metropolitan and country centres. FreightRail also managed freight train timetabling, train control and signalling functions outside the metropolitan area. It too published its own timetables.

This embedding of timetabling functions within separate entities has still to be fully shaken off.

The 1996 disaggregation took place in the context of—and was driven by—NSW’s participation in the NCP agreements. In his second reading speech, the Minister for Transport said:

Our reforms are the fullest response yet by an Australian State Government to the Competition Principles Agreement between the Commonwealth and the States. This Bill represents the most profound reform to rail system management ever undertaken in Australia. Indeed, it establishes principles which are the equal, and possibly in advance, of railway management practices anywhere in the world. Separating train operations from infrastructure management will dramatically improve the services of the State’s passenger and freight operations, and put the management of the track on a fully commercial footing aimed at ensuring that rail infrastructure facilities meet the users’ needs.

The 1996 restructure changed the nature of the Government rail industry from a single vertically integrated statutory authority, into a

Instructions to Station Masters, Guards, Drivers and all others concerned.
STATE RAIL AUTHORITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES

CITYRAIL - WORKING TIMETABLE

MONDAYS TO FRIDAYS

BOOK 1

From 26th February, 1996

INDEX
Timetable pages for Mondays to Fridays

	Page
Section 1:	
Bondi Junction - City - Bankstown - Regent's Park - East Hills - Macarthur - Cronulla - Helensburgh.....	101
Helensburgh - Cronulla - Macarthur - East Hills - Regent's Park - Bankstown - City - Bondi Junction.....	151
Section 2:	
Sydney - Port Kembla - Nowra (and Unanderra - Moss Vale).....	201
Nowra - Port Kembla - Sydney (and Moss Vale - Unanderra).....	221
Section 3:	
Hornsby (Up Shore Line) and Central to Carlingford - Parramatta - Macarthur.....	251
Macarthur - Parramatta - Carlingford to Central and Hornsby(Down Shore Line).....	325
Section 4:	
Granville to Richmond - Penrith - Lithgow.....	401
Lithgow - Penrith - Richmond to Granville.....	441
Section 5:	
Strathfield to Hornsby - Gosford - Wyong - Newcastle.....	501
Newcastle - Wyong - Gosford - Hornsby to Strathfield.....	551
Section 6:	
Broadmeadow /Newcastle to Maitland - Dungog - Scone.....	601
Scone - Dungog - Maitland to Newcastle /Broadmeadow.....	610
Section 7:	
Campbelltown to Moss Vale - Goulburn - Canberra.....	701
Canberra - Goulburn - Moss Vale to Campbelltown.....	710
Section 8:	
Metropolitan Freight Lines Down.....	801
Up.....	802

Timetables for Weekends and Public Holidays appear in Book 2.

P. Silcock
General Manager, Network Control

What David Hill found when he stuck his head in at the door of Network Control in 1996— “...I thought I owned them. I said: ‘Look, you own timetabling, how come we introduced a timetable that couldn’t work’. They said: ‘No, no, we got a specification from CityRail down the corridor. They told us what they wanted. We simply drew a timetable to meet their specifications....’ ...so I abolished them”. Well, it does say Network Control.

horizontal structure. Under sections 19C and 19D of the Transport Administration Amendment (Rail Restructuring and Corporatisation) Act 1996, **Rail Access Corporation** was constituted as a State owned corporation under the State Owned Corporations Act 1989 with power to hold, manage and establish efficient, safe and

reliable infrastructure facilities, and to promote and facilitate access to the New South Wales rail network in accordance with the New South Wales Rail Access Regime. Rail infrastructure facilities were defined under section 19A(1)(a) to include railway track, associated track structures, cuttings, drainage works, track sup-

port earthworks, tunnels, bridges, level crossings, signalling systems, train control systems, communications systems and overhead power supplying systems. The Minister said:

To perform its functions effectively, the Rail Access Corporation will develop and maintain an informed customer capability: it will understand and specify its needs and verify that they are being adequately provided by its suppliers, but it will not undertake such works itself to do so would be to distract the management of the corporation from the more important task of administering the open access regime.

An access agreement between SRA and RAC was signed. This agreement had as its purpose access to RAC owned track by SRA for the conduct of train services. It was a ten year agreement, due to expire on 30 June 2006.

The Rail Services Authority was constituted by section 19U. The principal objectives of RSA included to be an efficient, safe and reliable supplier of goods and provider of services to the rail industry in New South Wales. The RSA was later made a State owned corporation pursuant to the State Owned Corporations Act 1989 by the Transport Administration Amendment (Rail Services Authority Corporation) Act 1998.

Two train operating entities emerged from the restructuring- Freight Rail for freight train services and a re-organised State Rail Authority for passenger services.

FreightRail Corporation was constituted by section 19G as a State owned corporation. One of its principal objects under section 19H(1) was to operate efficient, safe and reliable freight rail services. FreightRail thus became an 'access seeker' from RAC/SRA and had to compete for train paths.

Section 4 of the 1996 Act re-constituted the **State Rail Authority** and its principal objectives included to operate efficient, safe and reliable railway passenger services. The SRA was in turn subdivided into CountryLink and CityRail- this had consequences for train planning too. It might be thought that the SRA would give up train planning to RAC or RSA, but this was not to be, as the Minister emphasised:

The State Rail Authority will retain



Knowledge Nation re-visited? No, this is not Barry Jones' Spaghetti & Meatballs diagram- but the artist surely studied under the same teacher. This is how the NSW Rail Infrastructure Corporation sees its task of compiling timetables for the SRA. Lucky for it, it doesn't actually have to do the work..... The SRA does it for them

its identity but will shed its infrastructure management, track maintenance and freight activities. It will become a specialist passenger train operator through its CityRail and CountryLink divisions. This means that the State Rail Authority will be able to concentrate on the delivery of high quality, efficient and value-for money passenger services without having to concern itself with track maintenance, infrastructure, project management and other related issues. These will be matters for the Rail Access Corporation and the Railway Services Authority.

From July, the State Rail Authority will be free to press for improvements to the system as a customer, rather than as an infrastructure provider which also has an obligation to run trains.

It seems apparent from this speech that train timetabling was destined to remain with the SRA.

RAC became the owner of the rail infrastructure. The SRA was stripped back to a passenger train organisation by vesting the infrastructure assets previously owned by the former State Rail Authority

2005 CityRail timetable effective 4 September

Part of our plan to improve reliability on the network



CEO message

Our new 2005 CityRail timetable will help us deliver safer and more reliable services to our customers.

This important initiative needs the active support of all of us to make it work successfully for our customers.

The new timetable is about running a safer, but slower network reflecting the variety of new safety practices we have been introducing.

Your efforts to introduce and bed down the new timetable are vital. A big thank you to each and every one of you as your efforts have been and will continue to be central to the success of our new timetable.

Vivian Dawson
Chief Executive Officer

Your role is important

Every RailCorp employee has a role in making our new 2005 CityRail timetable a success.

The new timetable is for all lines (except the Eastern Suburbs & Bayswater Line and the South Coast Line) and will be introduced on Sunday 4 September. The new timetable will mean changes to daily routes for many of our customers.

This brochure provides some of the information you will need to start familiarising yourself with the changes being made.

The new timetable is part of our plan to improve reliability on the network. Other parts of the plan include:

- A new timetable for the Eastern Suburbs & Bayswater Line and South Coast Line, planned for March 2006
- Reliability improvement program for fleet and infrastructure
- 120 new Outer Suburban Carriages starting delivery early next year
- Building new infrastructure as part of the Rail Clearways Plan



These days, you not only have to **make** a timetable— you have to **sell** it... And that includes selling it to **your own staff**. This is how CityRail sold its new SWTT in September this year

in RAC and by transferring track maintenance to RSA. The reforms thus created two State owned corporations two statutory authorities, SRA and RSA. With the subsequent corporatisation of RSA in 1998, the SRA was the only part of the railway which was not corporatised.

The new structure was unusual because, instead of one infrastructure entity, there were two- RAC and RSA. This went further than any other disaggregation and it had important consequences for how train services were planned. In the UK, RailTrack both owned the

track, managed the track and was responsible for planning serves (timetabling). In NSW, infrastructure management and train planning became separated to the detriment of good management and— according to the Glenbrook enquiry—safety. National Rail Corporation complained in a written submission to the Enquiry that it had an access agreement with RAC, but because RAC did not even manage network control functions, the latter could not effectively influence day to day train access decisions.

SRA complained that deterioration in the level of maintenance dis-

rupted train services for which its customers held them responsible. McNerney took evidence from David Hill of the SRA on how train planning was affected:

When I arrived in 1997 I tried to ascertain how the railways, with 140 years of experience, could introduce a timetable that couldn't work...I went to Network Control and I thought I owned them. I said: 'Look, you own timetabling, how come we introduced a timetable that couldn't work'. They said: 'No, no, we got a specification from CityRail down the other end of the corridor. They told us what they wanted. We simply drew a timetable to meet their specifications. It is there'.

So I went to CityRail and said: 'It is yours'. They said: 'No, no, we simply surveyed our passengers and gave them the passenger loading numbers and the generic shape of what we wanted. They designed it'.

So I abolished them both. And there were good people running them...It was the next day I was told that what I had done was illegal, that the SRA did not own [Network Control] even though we employed the people, it was under contract to the RAC.

MacInerney recommended that SRA and RAC be brought together again as the Rail Infrastructure Corporation (RIC) and this was duly done.

Timetabling by RAC (& now RIC) was governed by a key document—the *Operations Protocol*. This rather peculiar document spelled out in minute detail how the administrative mill was meant to grind out Working Timetables. In its 12th edition by 1999, it was a *Schedule* to the Access Agreements which RAC had with operators, including the SRA. RAC used it to specify the train services it supplied to its Access Seekers. In theory, it should have been RAC/RIC which had responsibility for doing the work of framing the timetable but, in practice (as Hill pointed out) RAC subcontracted out this work to the SRA's Train Planning Section. SRA therefore had to deal with the train operators directly, while being a competitive consumer with them, so there was potential for monopolistic power to determine train paths in favour of one operator. This is exactly what the other operators complained about.



Dick Day, RailCorp's General Manager Rail Development, looks a worried man—he is a worried man. On his head would fall the wrath of the Minister if the new timetable went awry. When it came out, his name wasn't on it.

The Operations Protocol still exists and describes the day-to-day management of the interfaces between: a) RIC and SRA; b) RIC and a Rail Operator; and c) SRA and a Rail Operator as they affect the delivery of Train Planning, Train Programming and Train Control services. The Operations Protocol includes a description of the following processes:

- Standard Working Timetable (SWTT) generation;
- Amendments to the SWTT via Special Train Notices (STNs) and GM Telegrams, due to Train Paths Applications from Rail Operators;
- Daily Train Plan preparation; and
- The exercise of real-time Train Control, including the description and application of Train Decision.

Rail Operators seek permanent alterations to their Train Path entitlements when a new SWTT is being generated or in the intervening period, via a Special Train Notice (STN). They seek, via the Daily Train Plan (DTP), one-off variations to their allocated Train Paths and

access to specific Train Paths that are not already allocated to a Rail Operator.

ARTC NSW leases

The operation of the NSW Interstate, non-Sydney, freight system by an 'outside' body was telegraphed some years before it came to pass, being first mentioned in the Brew Report. The *'Tracking Australia'* report in 1998 also briefly addressed this issue and supported the idea of a truly national track network under unitary control (it was referred to as *Son of One Nation*).

ARTC control of NSW 'national track' eventually came to pass in 2003. Many and varied reasons were given for this arrangement, but probably the Streaker's Defence—it seemed like a good idea at the time—best encapsulates it. It was largely driven by Commonwealth Transport Minister John Anderson, who had become frustrated with the problems of operating NRC trains over the NSW network, and with the NSW Government's unwillingness to spend money on freight rail infrastructure. With the enticement of \$870

million of ARTC funding for the latter, the 60-year lease quickly became a reality. There were effectively three separate leases for (1) the Interstate Track, (2) the Hunter Valley Coal lines and (3) the NSW Regional Link lines. In addition, ARTC assumed 'management control' for what it called the 'Residual Network' and what RailCorp called the 'Country Regional Network'—which was the balance of NSW rural track. There is shared control over these lines— which are extensive but lightly trafficked and the actual management arrangements are a trifle hazy.

The enabling legislation for the leased lines made it clear that all of the features of the NSW RIC Access Undertaking—and the employees— were to be transferred to ARTC, including the mechanisms of train control and the timetabling system (referred to as 'train planning'). This resulted in the timetabling practices being transferred holus-bolus from one to the other. Indeed, for the first few issues of the Country SWTT, joint publication was the norm. Eventually, timetable compilation was separated according to the boundaries, which are described in exquisite millimetre detail in ARTC's *Boundary Definition Survey*.

The existing centres for Train Control and timetabling were to be maintained for 3 years, after which ARTC could move to a single centre, not necessarily in NSW. Despite legislative clauses forbidding it, ARTC tried to entice RIC timetableers away from Sydney to Adelaide, but few wanted to go. Refuge was found for the others within RailCorp.

Initially ARTC's NSW WTTs continued RailCorp/RIC's practice of referring to their access seekers according to the names they had when the seekers first sought access— i.e. NRC, FreightCorp, etc. From September 2005, the real names have been used— Pacific National, for instance, (who had been operating trains for 2 years before they ever appeared in a timetable). Apart from a nice graphic of a steam loco, ARTC's NSW lease SWTTs resemble RailCorp's in every respect. This is hardly surprising given that they use the same software and that ARTC staff came over from RailCorp. The Country Regional Network has no timetables (neither ARTC nor RailCorp), but ARTC Special Train No-

tices are often issued for them.

There obviously has to be close coordination between Rail Corp and ARTC, but the timetables and Special Train Notices are presented in a way such that trains pop in and out of existence at the boundaries, like rabbits coming and going from a burrow. This raises the interesting point of how a trans-continental operator like Pacific National actually manages to extract a satisfying schedule for its Perth-Brisbane services passing through 5 jurisdictions (WestNet, ARTC, ARTC-NSW, RailCorp, QR). From this point of view, the much lauded 'one-stop shop' seems as distant as ever.


ARTC also moved in September 2005 to structure its NSW timetables as a 'Daily Train Plan', in the way that had done for some years on its own network. The resultant timetable, where a 7-day a week train appears 7 times, has ballooned to a massive 550 pages.

Victoria

If rail implementation of NCP went off the rails anywhere, it was in Victoria. This was despite the fact that Victoria was first off the mark with Open Access to its tracks, when West Coast Railway and Hoys Ltd. took out passenger franchises in 1993. This was even in advance of the UK precedent and coincided roughly with the first in the world, that of Sweden.

Train planning and timetable compilation and production had resided in the same office of the old Victorian Railways since at least the 1890s. As on most railways, the system used was entrenched and stable. Those were the days when a timetable collector could front up to the famous Room 73 in the giant grey headquarters building and be handed free copies of the Working Time Table over the counter.

VR was a hermetically sealed entity isolated by break of gauge until 1962, when the standard gauge line connecting Melbourne to Wodonga opened. Even then, jurisdictional overlap was fiercely resisted and, save for the fact that passengers and freight were no longer transhipped, the border mentality remained. Trains still changed locomotives, crews and identities—and slipped from one timetable book to another—as they changed jurisdictions. It was im-



More spaghetti. ARTC entered into 3 complex leases with RailCorp and now controls all of the "Interstate Network" (blue) in NSW, plus some connecting lines (red, green). It also manages the so-called Residual Network". In making timetables, however, it still has to do it the RailCorp way—the two products are like peas from a pod.

possible, even, to bring a NSW locomotive onto the VR system.

The first visible change to train planning came in the early 1980s, when proposals for radical reform came from the Passenger Manager, a man who had previously made a name for himself in the railway enthusiast field. The vastly increased passenger service which resulted attracted greatly increased patronage- reversing a trend and disproving the nay-sayers that rail was on the way out.

The *Chief Traffic Manager's* office became that of the *Chief Operations Manager*, with this change,

but this was not a significant restructure and the timetables continued in their century old format—apart from moving to computerized typesetting.

These changes preceded by about 2 years the conversion of the State's railways from a Commission to two Authorities- a change which came about with the Cain Government's State Transport Act of 1983. The country rail operations of the new State Transport Authority (STA) were rebranded as 'V/Line' and the first V/Line timetables appeared in 1986. At this time the volumes of the country

Working Timetable were amalgamated into one volume. In suburban Melbourne, a Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA, 'The Met') was formed. It produced its own rail timetables, but shared its timetabling facilities with the STA.

On 1-Jul-1989, the STA and MTA were re-amalgamated and corporatised. Later that year, after a rather peculiar incident involving a timetable collector, V/Line rebranded its Working Time Table as a 'Master Train Plan' but The Met (later 'Met Trains') never did. From the mid 1980s to the mid-1990s V/Line issued its working timetables with great frequency- 6 or more per year. An unusual feature, negotiated by the AATTC's Albert Isaacs, was the public sale of Working Timetables and Master Train Plans. It was a hard task to convince the STA that WTTs were marketable commodities.

The advent of the National Rail Corporation, the opening of the Melbourne-Adelaide standard gauge line and the start-up of Specialised Container Transport saw the first inroads (inrails?) made by 'foreign' operators. SCT, the first private rail operator to gain access to a part of the interstate network, started a Melbourne to Perth freight service in July 1995.

NCP hit V/Line in the middle of 1996, when the Victorian Rail Corporations Act came into being. The Victorian Rail Access Regime (VRAR) was incorporated directly into the Act, which led to many difficulties when things later went wrong. The Act is consequently now in its Version 036. These are not minor variations- every time a new entity is created, a major revamp of the Act takes place. In Version 001, V/Line was vertically separated into a corporatised infra-

structure owner Victorian Rail Access Corporation (*Vic Track Access*) and a corporatised freight operating entity (V/Line Freight). V/Line passenger services remained part of the PTC.

In 1997, a separate Rail Corporations Amendment Act foreshadowed a privatised V/Line Freight and established 4 entities for suburban transport- Met Trains 1 & 2 and Met Tram 1 & 2. Yet another separate amending Act in 1998 transferred V/Line's passenger services into a new Corporation, V/Line Passenger. All these entities were Government Corporations, but they were being readied for sale. Later that year yet another Act assigned trading names to these bodies. The Working and Public timetables that were produced during this time changed apparent owners and publishers every few months.


There was also an Office of the Regulator General (ORG), an independent regulator established under the Office of the Regulator-General Act 1994. ORG was later subsumed by the Essential Services Commission (ESC). In administering the Victorian rail access regime, ORG's objectives, which were set out in section 38B of the Rail Corporations Act 1996, were:

- (1) to ensure users have fair and reasonable access to declared rail transport services; and
- (2) to give passenger services priority over freight services.

Vic Track Access took over responsibility for train planning. This induced another rebranding of timetables- to the *Network Service Plan* (NSP).

In June 1998, in preparation for privatisation, Met Trains was split into two administrative units Met Train 1 and Met Train 2, which were given the trading names of Bayside Trains and Hillside Trains a few months later. The timetabling functions of these two entities were closely intertwined, sharing the same office to start with, but becoming next door neighbours a little later. They continued to operate this way until sell-off in December 1999, issuing Metropolitan WTTs in combined volumes at first, but in separate volumes after July 1999.

From about this time, the paths followed by rural and suburban passenger and freight operations



The way V/Line did it 20 years ago, in its days as a Government Authority.

began to diverge and became very muddled.

Rural passenger

The original intention had been to follow the NSW model of vertical separation. However, sustained lobbying by potential purchasers of V/Line Freight (especially Wisconsin Central) lead to an apparent change of heart. The Government decided to emulate the U.K. rail system and to offer the country passenger services via a franchise, for which competitive bids would be sought. The Director of Public Transport became a franchising office, a la OPRAF in the UK, the only place in Australia where this happened.

At first, Vic Track Access had responsibility for train planning for V/Line Passenger and its name appeared on the covers of the timetables. Within a year, however, the name of V/Line Freight appears in its place, when passenger timetabling was transferred to it. It would seem that the Government-owned V/Line Freight prepared only one system Passenger & Freight Passenger timetable before it was sold off.

When V/Line Freight eventually was leased—to the Freight Victoria consortium for 45 years—the timetabling functions went with it. This led to the situation where V/Line Passenger had to seek timetable slots from Freight Victoria. It also led to the cessation of production of paper NSPs (WTTs).

V/Line continued to operate as a government entity for another 3 years. A franchise for it was offered for sale at the end of 1998 and the sale concluded in August 1999, the successful bidder being the UK-based National Express Group, which signed the document as *NX Australia (V/Line Passenger)*.

Key features of the 10 year franchise relevant to timetabling were:

- * A complex passenger service requirement
- * An Operational Performance Regime, with financial incentives for punctuality
- * Pre-determined, but declining, subsidy levels for each year of contract.

The Franchise document was an astonishing piece of work, running to some 900 pages. Its Section 7 dealt extensively with timetabling

and its Appendix H was the 'Master Timetable'- (MTT) essentially what had previously been known as V/Line's *Staff Reference Timetable* (6-Dec-1998 edition). A sample page of this, cut and pasted directly from the Franchise, appears below. No railway restructuring in the world had been so didactic about what the service was to be. As part of the franchise, a new Master Timetable was required for 1-May-2000.

Specifying the exact train service via a pre-existing MTT was a rather schizoid approach, given that V/Line Passenger had to obtain its train paths from the Freight Victoria. There was little in the franchise document that spelled out how the MTT was to dovetail with Freight Victoria's *Network Service Plan*, but the implication (it was hardly more than that) was that when push

came to shove, passenger services would be awarded paths ahead of freight services, under Section 38B of the Act. Potential conflict with Freight Victoria's services would in any case be minimal because passenger services dominated the system, with V/Line running some 200 services per day and Freight Victoria a mere 30. In terms of tonnes carried per km of track, Victoria is far and away the least used freight railway in Australia, its nearest competitor—Tasmania—carries nearly four times the density. V/Line was not allowed to introduce train paths that conflicted with those of West Coast Rail or Hoys.

It all came to naught because the system, the franchisee or the public failed to deliver. In December 2002, National Express withdrew from the V/Line franchise (and

Pumpkin Hour arrives— and the Staff Reference Timetable is magically transformed into the Master Timetable, Jeff Kennett's bid to make the machinery work came unstuck in a spectacular manner

TABLE 200

TABLE 200

MELBOURNE - BACCHUS MARSH - BALLARAT

Days of operation	Monday to Friday						
Service No.	8123	8125	8127	8129	8131	8133	8135
Train/Coach	Train	Train	Train	Train	Train	Train	Train
Seating	Econ	Econ	Econ	Econ	Econ	Econ	Econ
MELBOURNE ^{dep.}	pm 5 00	pm 5 07	pm 5 19	pm 5 40	pm 5 45	pm 6 09	pm 6 45
North Melbourne	5 04u	5 11u	5 23u	5 44u	5 49u	6 13u	6 49u
Footscray		5 16u	5 28u		5 54u	6 18u	6 53u
Sunshine	5 14u	5 22u	5 36u	5 54u	6 01u	6 25u	6 59u
Ardeer		5 25	5 39			6 28	7 02
Deer Park		5 29	5 43			6 32	7 06
Rockbank		5 39	5 52			6 42	7 14
Melton		5 47	5 59		6 22	6 50	7 20
BACCHUS MARSH ^{arr.}		6 02	6 12		6 37	7 04	
Bacchus Marsh ^{dep.}							7 31
Ballan ^{arr.}	6 01			6 37			7 51
BALLARAT ^{arr.}	6 30			7 05			8 27

Days of operation	Monday to Friday				Saturday	
Service No.	8137	8139	8141		8103	8109
Train/Coach	Train	Train	Train	Coach	Train	Train
Reservation Required						
Wheelchair Reservation						
Seating	Econ	Econ	Econ	Econ	1st & Econ	Econ
MELBOURNE ^{dep.}	pm 7 45	pm 8 35	pm 9 35	pm 9 45	am 8 10	am 9 05
North Melbourne			9 43u			9 13u
Footscray	7 53u		9 49u			9 20u
Sunshine	7 59u	8 49u	9 52		8 24u	9 23
Ardeer			9 56			9 26
Deer Park			10 04			9 34
Rockbank			10 10			9 40
Melton	8 21	9 04	10 23		8 41	9 56
BACCHUS MARSH ^{arr.}	8 34					
Bacchus Marsh ^{dep.}		9 15			8 53	
Ballan ^{arr.}		9 35			9 14	
BALLARAT ^{arr.}		10 03		11 25	9 50	
Ballarat ^{dep.}				11 30 M		

Additional Symbols:
M - To Mildura, see Table 308.

from M>Tram and M>Train) and receivers were appointed by Government. The Government announced that it would buy back the Franchise and award it to a newly reconstituted Government-owned V/Line Passenger. The Rail Corporations Act was duly amended yet again to give effect to this decision.

The terms of the Franchise, as they related to timetabling were then somewhat askew and the Government duly announced that the Franchise would be rewritten to reflect the changed conditions. The first? new Master Timetable under Government ownership (i.e. the Staff Reference Timetable) was issued by V/Line's Network Planning office in July 2004.

Regional Fast Rail and the 2006 timetable.

This is an interesting case of modern timetabling confusion. The project, clearly a political animal because it was part of Labor's successful push for Government in 1999, emerged in the 2000 Victorian budget, when V/Line was still in the clutches of National Express. At this time, under the banner of 'Linking Victoria', a plethora

of rail projects were being considered, including restoration of passenger service to Mildura (the Government held power by virtue of a Mildura Independent) and the conversion of some or all of the broad gauge network to standard gauge. The Government commissioned a study into the various options, but the only concrete proposal was the Regional Fast Rail (RFR) project.

As the below rail lessor, the Department of Infrastructure was given the controlling role in bringing RFR to fruition. V/Line appears to be driving the process and one might suppose that it can do so under the terms of the Passenger Franchise. But that Franchise also requires interaction with the player who holds all the aces- the Access provider, Pacific National.

At the end of 2004, V/Line released a draft timetable for public comment. V/Line used the rail network programming tool Viriato to build the new timetable, probably the first time such a program has been used for an Australian rural passenger network.

Although V/Line has sought pub-

lic comment on what it proposed, it also cautioned those who would comment that PN (and Connex) will be the main determinants of what actually comes to pass. V/Line put it thus: *Importantly, Connex, Melbourne's train operator, and Pacific National, Victoria's track manager for regional rail and its main rail freight operator, are continuing their comprehensive review of V/Line's draft 2006 timetable. This is a crucial step as it will ensure an integrated metropolitan and regional timetable that caters for country and city passengers as well as for freight.*

Rural freight


Freight Victoria (which was really Rail America, a conglomerate of largely American regional lines) continued to produce a Network Service Plan, but only in electronic form. There was no requirement under the regime to put information like this into the public domain, as there was in other jurisdictions. However such an entity continued to exist and the ESC, which referred to it as the *Master Timetable for Freight*, made rulings that it had to be supplied to potential access seekers.

The two standard gauge lines are leased by ARTC from Victoria, but Victoria still retains some measure of control and, in any case, they must interdigitate with trains on the broad gauge network. Hence these trains have dual identities, with both 'Victorian Train Numbers' (a system devised in the 1980s) and National Train numbers (a system devised by NRC).

Freight Victoria—which by then was trading under the name Freight Australia—was also in trouble as early as 2000 and for roughly similar reasons as NX was. Freight Australia took the unusual step in May 2001 of asking the NCC for its own Access Regime to be *declared* under Section 44F of the Trade Practices Act. Apparently in response, the Victorian Government made its own application in July under section 44M to have the regime *certified effective*.

In December 2001, the NCC declined to declare the Regime, and Freight Australia lodged an objection to have the decision reviewed. Meanwhile, the NCC was gradually extracting from the Victorian Government concessions on the regime that looked like leading towards certification. In the middle of all

Paying lip service to public participation? V/Line sets forth its idea of how the new 2006 timetables were conceived. But the tail that wags the dog is the "Operator" of the infrastructure - nowadays Pacific National.



this, in August 2002, the Victorian Government abruptly withdrew its certification application. Everything was back to square 1, but the Victorian Government had taken on notice that nobody was happy with the Access Regime as it then existed.

In 2004, Freight Australia sold out to Pacific National, who acquired not only a train operator, but also an infrastructure owner and train planner. There was a great deal of angst over this purchase, particularly from the point of view of competition policy. Selling out the vertically-integrated system to an organisation that already had a near-monopoly on interstate traffic was seen as entrenching what many viewed as a highly unsatisfactory access regime, where nobody except the owner seemed to be able to get a train path.

Suburban

Until about 1980, the suburban rail network of VR had been fully integrated into the state system from an administrative and timetabling point of view- the Chief Traffic Managers office always framed the timetables. With the advent of the City Underground Loop, this changed only in a cosmetic sense (there was a change format for the WTT) and in the frequency of issue (which increased). The State Transport Authority and the Public Transport Corporation (The Met) continued these practices.

As with the rural services, suburban trains were franchised in Kennet's big changes. There were to be two essentially non-competitive railways. Like the U.K. situation, this was competition only in the sense that there was competition **for** the franchises, not **between** them.

The Bayside franchise became the property of Connex, largely a French company, and Hillside's franchise was bought by National Express (NX), a UK consortium. Both owned several franchises in the UK. There was, however, a certain degree of overlap (if not strictly competition) on some lines, most notably the Underground Loop, where trains of both franchisees had to be coordinated. This required a certain degree of cooperation between the two companies' timetabling offices, which continued to be physical neighbours in the Flinders St station building.

The parallels with the United Kingdom were striking:- the same Franchise arrangements, the same detailed service requirements, the same support payments metamorphosing into dividends, the same promises to make it all work by boosting patronage and cutting costs... and the same failures. The franchises were every bit as comprehensive as that for V/Line and included similar provisions about timetabling. They did not, however, specify a particular timetable in the way that the V/Line franchise had with its *Master Timetable*.

For a short while, it looked like Jeff Kennett had pulled off a miracle as reported patronage on the system began to grow. Both companies ordered new rolling stock and set about upgrading stations. This did not last long. There were problems with the ticketing system and the Companies' approach to fare collection and their image plummeted.


As the franchise subsidies plummeted, revenue stalled. National Express, which had re-branded itself M>Train, fared worse than Connex, an attribute which was mirrored in the two companies' operations in Europe. In December 2001, M>Train forecast a shortfall of \$170 million and, in January 2002, it produced what was to be its last new timetable. After this,

the steam seemed to go out of it and, in December 2002, M>train went the way of V>Line (and M>tram), when National Express walked away from the contracts. The Government rushed to fill the gap and eventually refranchised the M>Train network to Connex, who continue to operate it. There have, however, been no substantial timetable changes since 2003.

Reform of the access regime

The sustained criticisms of the Track Access Regime that came up in the 2001-2002 declaration/certification imbroglio, the M>Train disaster and an investigation of the Freight Australia sale by the ACCC, led the Victorian Government to announce an enquiry into reforming the regime. A particular focus of the Enquiry was on making freight operations more competitive. The Government intends to reform the VRAR to extend its scope to apply to passenger rail services, including access to below-rail infrastructure and related services for the purposes of passenger services. The Government considered whether to enshrine the principle of passenger priority in the VRAR instead of in another part of the Act .

In developing a new VRAR, the Government decided to give the ESC significant formal roles and



Tweedledum and Tweedledee lived just down the corridor from one another- their timetables naturally looked rather similar.

important discretions relevant to timetabling. In particular, the ESC will be required to perform a number of sequential tasks:

Initially, the Commission will develop a number of *Instruments* with which an access provider will be required to comply. The Commission will release drafts of these Instruments for public consultation. The ESC will be required to make the following Commission Instruments:

- Ring Fencing Rules which will require an access provider to separate its access activities from its other activities, will specify the manner in which the access provider is to effect that separation and will require an access provider that provides declared transport services to itself or to related bodies corporate, to provide those services on an arms' length basis;
- Capacity Use Rules which will regulate an access provider's activities of assessing and allocating the capacity of a rail network and allocating train paths, will require access providers and users to surrender certain unutilized or under utilised train paths and may require access providers to prepare protocols for the allocation of the capacity of a network;
- Network Management Rules which will regulate an access provider's rail network management activities, such as train service scheduling and planning, train control services, management of the interaction of rail infrastructure and rolling stock and management of incidents that affect the operation of a rail network;
- Negotiation Guidelines which will specify the information that an access provider must provide to an access seeker, the procedure under which an access seeker may apply for the provision of a declared rail transport service, the procedure and method as to how (and the associated timeframes in which) an access provider will assess applications for access, and which may specify the fees or levies that an access provider may charge in relation to applications and may address interconnection.

Following the publication of In-

struments and the commencement of the new access regime, each access provider will be required to submit a proposed access arrangement for approval by the Commission. After the Commission has approved a proposed access arrangement, it will have a dispute resolution and an enforcement role.

Queensland

National Competition Policy has touched Queensland the least. All of the machinery exists, but the system remains pretty much an hermetically sealed, old-fashioned, Government-run railway monopoly.

For long regarded as a kind of bucolic anachronism, QR was driven into the modern railway world in the 1970s by coal. It has become one of the largest coal-hauling railways on the planet, moving over 150 million tonnes of the stuff per year, running nearly 2000 trains per week. By 2007, it will be carrying as much tonnage in one week as it did in one year half a century ago.

In those days, despite its bucolic, low intensity traffic, QR was capable of producing timetables in 5 volumes, running to 750 pages of bewildering complexity. Now, with 50 times the traffic, it produces no paper timetables at all.

In 1998, Queensland Rail established within its corporate structure a Network Access Group, now referred to as Queensland Rail National Access (QRNA). This Group's responsibilities include management of the infrastructure assets, negotiating access contracts with train operators and train control.

The remaining activities of Queensland Rail were divided into divisions including:


- a coal and mainline freight division which covers coal, minerals and train-loaded freight;
- a metropolitan and regional services division which provides passenger and freight services to metropolitan and regional areas;
- a technical services group which provides engineering and technical skill;
- a long distance and tourist train division;
- a maintenance and manufacturing support division
- an administrative division.

Before train services can operate on QR's rail network, there must be an *Access Agreement* with QRNA that sets out the terms on which those services may operate. This agreement may be with the operator who is safety accredited to operate those services, or with another party (e.g. a coal mine) provided that the party ensures that train services are run by a safety accredited operator. QRNA is responsible for negotiating and managing all access agreements.

QRNA supplies a prodigious amount of supporting information to potential access seekers, including full track diagrams, curve and gradient diagrams, maps of safe-working systems, running times and electrification details. These are principally in a series of 15 *Information Packs*, each of which may be many hundreds of pages long, for its regional 'systems'. Like ARTC, it also produces a huge *Access Undertaking*, setting out the entire process for Access Seekers. Its December 2001 Access Undertaking is well over 150 pages and its Draft Undertaking for 2005 is even larger. Schedule G to the Undertaking contains details of how the *Master Train Plan (MTP)*, the *Weekly Train Plan (WTP)* and the *Daily Train Plan (DTP)* are to be drawn up.

Operators feed into the timetable process by submitting a *Conceptual Operating Plan* on a standard form. This can also be used to alter an existing service, develop infrastructure and for an initial estimate for below rail cost. This document provides a high level detail of the access seeker's proposed operations, and enables QRNA to consider the proposal and determine its viability from a range of perspectives.

The information sought in a conceptual operating plan includes details on physical characteristics of the train, commodities to be transported, distances to be travelled, network sections to be accessed, regularity of the proposed service, etc. This information enables QRNA to determine the ability of the train to access the rail network, giving consideration to existing services that may interact with the proposed services. It would seem, therefore, that QR is just about the only system that formally listens to what its Access Seekers want, rather than doling out train paths it has decided for itself- but then again, it is mostly



Once upon a time— well 2 decades ago—you could actually use the TravelTrain Timetable to travel by train. This is a cover of an 88-page timetable book of 29th June 1986. Today, the best you can hope for is half a dozen B&W single-page PDF files downloaded from the Internet.

talking to itself.

Queensland has a unique component to its arrangements with its Access Seekers- the *Train Service Entitlement*, which broadly specifies the number of services an operator may run and out of which the actual train paths are created. The Train Service Entitlement of an Access Holder is defined in terms of a number of Train Services that can be operated in a given time

period subject to constraints agreed between OR and the Access Holder. Timetabled Traffics are likely to be defined in terms of a *Train Path* between certain locations, on particular days, and at particular times. *Cyclic Traffics* are likely to be defined in terms of a number of *Train Services* within a particular period of time. The application of constraints is likely to vary significantly between different types of Train Services and may

include, but will not necessarily be limited to, the following:

- (i) specified days of operation and times at the origin and/or destination and where appropriate, specified arrival/departure times at intermediate locations, with an allowable variation around these specified time(s) for the scheduling of the Train Service;
- (ii) maximum time period between Train Services;
- (iii) minimum time period between Train Services;
- (iv) average Below Rail Transit Time;
- (v) the agreed threshold for on-time running of the Train Services;
- (vi) regularity of timetable reviews and the applicable review process; and
- (vii) allowable modifications of timetable, e.g. cancellation or deferral of services.

QR develops an initial specification of a Train Service Entitlement for an Access Seeker. QR and the Access Seeker then further refine this specification of the Train Service Entitlement during the negotiation process. The Train Service Entitlement is finally incorporated into the relevant Access Agreement.

In respect of Timetabled Traffics, the Train Service Entitlement is used to develop an initial timetable, which QR and the Access Holder are then required to adhere to unless and until such time as the timetable is varied in accordance with the Network Management Principles.

QRNA is, subject to the Network Management Principles, able to manage the scheduling of train plans, including the MTP, WTP and DTP, to optimise the use of the Rail Infrastructure as circumstances change. In doing so, QRNA uses reasonable endeavours to consult with other relevant infrastructure providers directly affected by the scheduling of particular train plans.

Access Rights are allocated to the first Access Seeker with whom QRNA can negotiate and execute an acceptable Access Agreement. If, at any time, two or more Access Seekers are seeking Access with respect to mutually exclusive Access Rights, each of the Access Seekers who has received an *Indicative Access Proposal* with respect to those mutually exclusive

Access Rights is advised that there is one or more other Access Seekers seeking to negotiate for mutually exclusive Access Rights.

Where the mutually exclusive Access Rights are sought by two or more Access Seekers who are competing in order to provide Train Services under a rail haulage agreement with the same Customer (a coal mine, for instance) for the same service, QRNA commences negotiations with each of the Access Seekers. It advances these negotiations to a stage where it has provided each Access Seeker with an Access Charge for the Access Rights sought on the assumption that either party will accept a standard Access Agreement.

An Access Agreement will be negotiated and executed with the Access Seeker who demonstrates to QR's reasonable satisfaction that it holds the contractual right to provide the Train Services for the Customer for which the Access Rights are sought, and that the Customer is agreeable to the execution of the Access Agreement with that Access Seeker.

Where the mutually exclusive Access Rights are sought by two or more Access Seekers and the Access Rights sought do not relate to the same traffic task, QR will finalise an Access Agreement for Access Rights with the Access Seeker with whom QR can agree to terms and conditions, including an Access Charge, which are considered by QR to be the most favourable in terms of the commercial performance of Below Rail Services.

If QR decides to conduct an auction or other formal tendering process for the purpose of allocating Available Capacity, the rules for the auction or formal tendering process must be approved by the Queensland Competition Authority (QCA) prior to the commencement of the auction or formal tendering process.


QR will expand the Capacity of the Rail Infrastructure in order to create sufficient Available Capacity to provide Access Rights sought by an Access Seeker where QR reasonably considers that, in respect of the Capacity expansion, the expected net additional Below Rail revenue, less any expected costs associated with the expansion, is sufficient to commercially justify the required expenditure.

This is all wonderful stuff, but completely pointless, because there **is** no competition for train paths, save for the recent start-up of Pacific National's daily freight service on the North Coast line.

Western Australia


Of all states, Western Australia seems to have taken its obligations on railways under NCP the most seriously. This is probably fitting as it seems to be the continuation of a century of meticulousness which arose with Federation in 1901. Before that, WA Railways were run more by the seat of the

pants than by a set of properly constituted management principles. It is said that WAGR's high standards in administration arose from the role played by Parliamentary draughtsmen in the writing of much management documentation. At any rate, we have preserved in Perth's Batty library a near-complete collection of all of the many documents related to timetabling, including all the timetables themselves, which chart a century of train planning. WAGR was still a paragon of railway administrative virtue as the 20th century drew to a close.



*Passenger
Services*

Working Timetables



Citytrain, Traveltrain and Airtrain
Suburban and Inter-Urban Passenger Services

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Only QR produces Working Timetables in colour. No printed copy of this timetable is produced though and it is doubtful if employees would bother to print the cover on their colour printers, anyway.

Following the national development of Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 in 1995, the WA Government developed a State based Rail Access Regime in 1998 by establishing the Act to apply to its Government owned rail businesses. These reforms were introduced with the aim at encouraging effective, fair and transparent competition in WA's rail freight industry. However, the full Regime did not come into effect until the gazettal of the *Access Code* on the 1st of September 2001. In implementing NCP, WA quite early on in the process established an *Office of the Rail Access Regulator* (ORAR), a twin of that set up in the UK and which served the same purposes which ORR did in the UK. In other states the regulation authority generally

had fingers in a lot more pies than just railways.

In December 2000, the non-Metropolitan operations of Westrail (Western Australian Government Railways Commission, WAGRC) were privatised by the WA Government by selling it to Australian Railroad Group Pty Ltd (ARG). The new entity, WestNet Rail (WNR), a subsidiary of ARG, was granted a 49 year lease of the rail freight network and is the network owner of the freight railway infrastructure for the purposes of access agreements under the Regime. The suburban operations were retained by WAGRC, which later was subsumed into the Public Transport Authority. Both WestNet Rail and the PTC are also train operators.

Consequently, the organisational structure of the WA railway owners is vertically integrated. The Regime is now administered by the Economic Regulation Authority (ERA), which subsumed the ORAR in 2004. The Regime has not been certified as effective. However, the Regime has been assessed by the NCC as being 'effective' for most criteria. It was not certified due to the WA Government's reluctance to make amendments to oblige the railway owner to have the Regime dissolved and become automatically covered in the event that a National Access Regime is established. The WA Government decided against this approach suggested by the NCC due to concerns about automatically committing to a Regime without first knowing the details.

Under the Access code, WestNet Rail draws up timetables containing *scheduled, flexible scheduled, unscheduled, reserved* and *conditional* train paths, and offers these to train operators—meaning mostly to itself, of course.

At the time that the new structures came into being, WestNet Rail submitted to the Regulator a number of proposed policies on Train Paths, Segregation Arrangements (ring fencing), Pricing, and Train Management. In each of these there was a varying degree of specification of how timetables were to be prepared. These proposals arose from clauses in the *Access Code* which, among other things laid down rules about the Working Time Table. After a period of public consultation, the Regulator refused to approve the Train Path Policy (TPP) and requested extensive amendments, which WestNet Rail had made by February 2003.

The TPP is designed to ensure that the allocation of Train Paths is undertaken in a manner that guarantees fairness of treatment between Operators and acknowledges existing contractual rights and any new contractual rights created under Access Agreements entered into under the Code. The 17-page WA TPP contains more details on how Operators manage to wedge their way into the timetable, than does any other Access Regime. The following are some relevant edited extracts.

Master Train Plan

WestNet will maintain a Master Control Diagram for those routes



Timetables for the Perth Suburban system, produced by TransPerth.

FORRESTFIELD TO GERALDTON

DOWN		556	869	6865	251
Km from Millendon Junction	Vide Km Post	W.F.	Tu,Th	F, SA(e)	M,Th
TABLE 146					
(21)	FORRESTFIELD# dep.	08 05	08 50	23 40	02 00
(15)	Woodbridge South# dep.	-	-	-	-
(14)	MIDLAND# dep.	08 20	09 05	23 55	02 10
0	Millendon Junction# dep.	08 30	09 20	00 10	02 25
2	Do arr.	-	-	-	-
-	Do dep.	-	-	-	-
25	Muchea# arr.	-	-	-	-
-	Do dep.	09 00	09 55	00 45	03 05
31	Chandale# arr.	09 15	10 00	01 00	-
-	Do dep.	-	-	-	-
56	Moolabeenie# arr.	-	-	-	-
-	Do dep.	-	-	-	03 50
100	Mogumber# arr.	-	-	-	-
-	Do dep.	-	-	-	04 45
-	Moora CBH# arr.	-	-	-	05 30
146	Moora# arr.	-	-	-	-
-	Do dep.	-	-	-	05 35
151	Cairn Hill# arr.	-	-	-	05 50
-	Do dep.	-	-	-	-
166	Coomberdale# arr.	-	-	-	-
-	Do dep.	-	-	-	-
185	Watheroo# arr.	-	-	-	-
-	Do dep.	-	-	-	-
214	Marchagee# arr.	-	-	-	-
234	Coorow# arr.	-	-	-	-

Train services on these sections may vary on a seasonal basis as advised by SPECIAL TRAIN NOTICE.

Train Path, WestNet may withdraw the rights to the Train Path.

WestNet may at its discretion by written notice given to the Operator cause a Train Path to be reviewed in a bona fide manner by the parties by comparing the stated departure and arrival times for the Train Path with the performance during the preceding continuous 3 month period of the actual trains using or purporting to use that reviewable entitlement. If on such comparison of the Train Path with the 3 month history the departure or arrival times for a Train using or purporting to use the Train Path differ in material respects, the parties will negotiate in good faith to amend the Train Path so that the Train Path reflects, as closely as is reasonably practicable, the 3 month history.

An Operator may not sell the rights to use a Train Path to another Operator.

(If there be more than one request) using alternative but similar Train Paths, the available Train Path will be provided to the Operator who first requested the Train Path and can establish that it has a requirement for the Train Path.

In the TPP, Master Control Diagram means a diagrammatic or electronic record covering specific parts of the Network which shows:

(iv) all Scheduled Train Paths (Freight or Passenger);

(v) all Flexible Scheduled Train Paths (Freight);

(vi) all Conditional Train Paths; and

(vii) all Reserved Train Paths.

In the TPP, Working Timetables means the train timetables and operating data for all or part of the network issued as part of the WestNet's Network Rules and as amended from time to time.

A requirement of the Code and the Train Path Policy is that working timetables be published publicly, and WestNet Rail duly lodges (or used to lodge) its timetables in the State Library. These do not, however, contain anything other than Westnet Rail's own scheduled train paths. Most timetable pages are devoid of trains, à la an American Employee Time Table. In this, WestNet differs from ARTC and NSW RailCorp which always publish timetables with all the possible train paths in them.

This, we think, is the first Westnet Working Timetable— part of Book 7 for the Northern Railway, the first leg out of Perth. Who now remembers what Muchea became famous for?

under its control that are subject to the Code. Initially these Master Control Diagrams will be those in existence at 1 September 2001 which recognize existing contractual arrangements for Access in place at that time.

Allocation of Train Paths

The Code provides a process for proponents to seek access to the Network for conducting train operations. There are various outcomes in relation to this process, one of which is that successful access seekers will obtain an entitlement to a Train Path. Access seekers are encouraged to review the Code including Sections 7, 8 and 9. It is also possible for proponents to seek a Train Path by negotiation with WestNet outside the provisions of the Code.

In negotiation of an Access Agreement the issue of allocation of Train Paths will be dealt with in accordance

with the T.P.P. and the requirements of the Code and specifically Section 16 (2) of the Code.

In the event that WestNet has not provided the Operators with suitable Train Paths and the Operator believes that WestNet has not complied with the TPP or provisions of the Code related to negotiation of Access Agreements they may seek to have the matter arbitrated as a dispute in accordance with Section 25 of the Code.

At the commencement of an Access Agreement the initial Train Paths will have been negotiated between the parties in accordance with the TPP. These will be recorded in a schedule to the Access Agreement and be amended from time to time in accordance with the TPP and the Access Agreement. Otherwise Train Paths will be allocated on a first come first served basis.

If an Operator has failed to use a

The Public Transport Authority (ex-WAGR) has a similar set of rules for allocating train paths in its Perth Suburban area.

The Access Code itself has been reviewed twice since 2001 (in 2003 and 2005). Despite the implementation of the Segregation Arrangements, a number of Access Seekers have become most dissatisfied with the way that the Regime is operating and feel that ARG is acting to their disadvantage, by squeezing them out of train paths.

South Australia and the Northern Territory

South Australia had the most systematized system for producing timetables of all the old State networks. Both public and working timetables were produced on a regular schedule and numbered sequentially, so it is easy to work out what was produced when. Although this is very redolent of American timetable practice, it predates the arrival of Webb by at least a decade. The State's first taste of 'disintegration' can be traced back to 1974 when it sold its rural rail network to the Commonwealth Government to form ANR. After the sale, the ANR and the State Transit Authority inherited and persisted with the SAR's timetable practices well into the 1990s. Now with 3 gauges, 5 owners and at least half a dozen operators, the South Australian railway regime presents a complex picture.

The Railways (Operations and Access) Act was proclaimed on 11 September 1997. The Act requires a regulator be appointed and sets out the regulator's functions. By proclamation, the regulator is the Essential Services Commission of South Australia (ESCOSA), previously the SA Independent Industry Regulator (SAIIR).

The purpose of the Act is 'to provide for the operation of railways, and access to railway services on fair commercial terms'. The South Australian Rail Access Regime is set out in Parts 3 to 8 of the Act. The regime was designed to accord with the requirements of Part IIIA of the Commonwealth Trade Practices Act 1974 for certification as an effective access regime. However, certification has not been sought. Neither the Regime nor the Code mention 'timetable' or 'train path', nor are there the plethora of guidance documents found for most other systems. There have



Competition Policy at work. The State: South Australia. The Infrastructure Provider: Flinders Power. The Train Operator: NSW Freight Corp. These days, Pacific National operates these trains, but it is impossible to find a timetable for them.

apparently been no access disputes nor any applications for declaration, places where details of train planning are often revealed. Consequently, the timetabling practices in South Australia remain shrouded in mystery.

A consolidated WTT does not exist for public consumption. Presumably only ARTC would be privy to such aggregated information - with individual train operators only having access to details about "their" trains running on ARTC territory.

By their very nature, pretty well all ARG (formerly ASR) movements, with the exception of their recently introduced interstate services, are seasonal in nature and are put on according to the requirements of the bulk grain sector. This often means that trains run at comparatively short notice and then on the basis of advice via Train Notice. Grain movements on Eyre Peninsula are probably similar. The only traffic that may be governed by a timetable could be the gypsum trains that operate regularly between Thevenard and Kevin on the far West Coast.

Because of the need to seek access from ARTC, some form of scheduling may exist for ARG movements to clear grain from ARTC-accessed lines serving places like Mallala, Bowmans, Snowtown, Red Hill, Gladstone, Yongala, etc, and the SG line to Wolseley.

(Thanks to John Evans for this

material)

As with many states, the suburban and rural networks are separately owned and vertically operated, with ostensibly Open Access for Access Seekers on both networks. In addition, there is the South Australian portion of the Tarcoola-Darwin line, also a vertically integrated but Open Access railway. The rural railway network that is subject to the Regime is in a bit of a 'Once Were Warriors' situation- a shadow of its former self, where Access Seekers are rarely interested in contesting for train paths. All the machinery to do so is laid out in the One Stop Shop—but no-one is stopping to look, much less to buy.

The rural freight network (it carries no passenger trains at all) is controlled by Australia Southern Railroad, an operating entity of Australian Railroad Group, itself largely owned by Genesee and Wyoming. It operates only a very small number of trains- so few, in fact, that it seems embarrassed to reveal the number on its web-site (unlike its WA cousin).

In the suburban area, the owner-operator TransAdelaide operates some 400 trains per day, a moderately healthy number for a city of its size (about the same, per capita as Melbourne). Working Timetables for either are rarely sighted.

South Australia is unusual in one respect, in that it has two lines which are vertically separated, but

yet are not part of the Rail Access Regime. The first is the Port Augusta-Leigh Creek line, owned by Flinders Power, which has contracted with Pacific National (formerly with FreightCorp) to run the trains. This was once a public railway. The other is the OneSteel (formerly BHP-Steel) lines in the Whyalla region, where the train service is contracted out to Australia Southern Railroad. This was once a private railway. In both cases information about timetable

practices is as scarce as the proverbial.

With only one railway and one train a day each way, the Northern Territory can scarcely be said to be a riveting subject for timetable fans. The legislation for the regime closely mirrors that of South Australia because, of course, they share the Tarcoola-Darwin line. This means it is similarly sparse on timetabling details. The Regime is, like South Australia's, theoretically Open Access, but vertically inte-

grated. There has been an attempt to get the regime declared, on the part of mining interests in the NT.

Tasmania

It is nearly a third of a century since Tasmania (or at least its Government) has had any role to play in the running of railways. Consequently, Tasmania has hardly been touched by NCP as it applies to rail.

For over a century, Tasmania had a higher proportion of private rail-

Gone on the Ghan. The Ghan is operated by a private train operator (Great Southern Railroad) over the Infrastructure provided by three access owners—ARTC, Australia Southern and Australia Pacific Track Corporation, under three different Access Regimes—ARTC, South Australia and the Northern Territory.



THE GHAN TIMETABLES

Timetables (valid 1 April 2005 to 31 March 2006)			
Adelaide - Alice Springs - Darwin			
The Ghan	Sun	Fr	Wed
Depart Adelaide	5:15pm	5:15pm	5:15pm
	Mon	Sat	Thu*
Arrive Alice Springs	11:55am	11:55am	1:40pm
Depart Alice Springs	4:10pm		8:00pm
	Sun	Fr	
Arrive Katherine	8:00am	8:00am	
Depart Katherine	12:10pm	2:15pm	
Arrive Darwin	4:30pm	5:15pm	
Broken Hill - Adelaide - Alice Springs - Darwin			
Indian Pacific	Sat	Wed	
Depart Sydney	2:50pm	2:50pm	
	Sat	Thurs	
Arrive Broken Hill	5:45am	5:45am	
Depart Broken Hill	8:20am	8:20am	
Arrive Adelaide	3:15pm	2:10pm†	
The Ghan	Sun	Fr	
Depart Adelaide	5:15pm	5:15pm	
	Mon	Sat	
Arrive Alice Springs	11:55am	11:55am	
Depart Alice Springs	4:10pm		
	Sun		
Arrive Katherine	8:00am		
Depart Katherine	12:10pm		
Arrive Darwin	4:30pm		
Melbourne - Adelaide - Alice Springs - Darwin			
The Overland	Sat	Thurs	
Depart Melbourne	10:10am	9:10am	
	Sat	Fr	
Arrive Adelaide	6:00am	7:10am	
The Ghan	Sun	Fr	
Depart Adelaide	5:15pm	5:15pm	
	Mon	Sat	
Arrive Alice Springs	11:55am	11:55am	
Depart Alice Springs	4:10pm		
	Sun		
Arrive Katherine	8:00am		
Depart Katherine	12:10pm		
Arrive Darwin	4:30pm		

Timetables (valid 1 April 2005 to 31 March 2006)			
Darwin - Alice Springs - Adelaide			
The Ghan	Wed	Sat	
Depart Darwin	10:00am	10:15am	
Arrive Katherine	1:40pm	2:15pm	
Depart Katherine	6:20pm	6:00pm	
	Thur	Sat	
Arrive Alice Springs	9:20am	7:00am	
Depart Alice Springs	12:45pm	2:00pm	10:10am
	Fr	Sun	
Arrive Adelaide	9:00am	8:10am†	8:30am†
Darwin - Alice Springs - Adelaide - Sydney			
The Ghan	Wed	Sat	
Depart Darwin	10:00am	10:15am	
Arrive Katherine	1:40pm	2:15pm	
Depart Katherine	6:20pm	6:00pm	
	Thur	Sat	
Arrive Alice Springs	9:20am	7:00am	
Depart Alice Springs	12:45pm	2:00pm	10:10am
	Fr	Sun	
Arrive Adelaide	9:00am	8:10am†	8:30am†
Indian Pacific	Fr	Tues	Tues
Depart Adelaide	10:00am	10:00am	10:00am
Arrive Broken Hill	4:30pm	4:30pm	4:30pm
Depart Broken Hill	8:30pm	8:30pm	8:30pm
	Sat	Wed	Wed
Arrive Sydney	10:10am	10:10am	10:10am
Darwin - Alice Springs - Adelaide - Melbourne			
The Ghan	Wed		
Depart Darwin	10:00am		
Arrive Katherine	1:40pm		
Depart Katherine	6:20pm		
	Thur	Sat	
Arrive Alice Springs	9:20am		
Depart Alice Springs	12:45pm	2:00pm	
	Fr	Sun	
Arrive Adelaide	9:00am	8:10am	
The Overland	Fr	Sun	
Depart Adelaide	10:00am	10:00am	
Arrive Melbourne	9:00pm	9:00pm	

All times are local times and may be subject to change. Call 13 71 41 for current timetables information or visit our website www.ghan.com.au. †Overnight in Adelaide, at your expense. ‡The Ghan only service available May 2005 to Aug 2005.

All times are local times and may be subject to change. Call 13 71 41 for current timetables information or visit our website www.ghan.com.au. †Overnight in Adelaide, at your expense. ‡The Ghan only service available May 2005 to Aug 2005.



ways than any other state, but there always seemed to be a degree of cooperation in train planning so that one could, for instance travel from Hobart to Queenstown on connecting trains on a sequence of 4 Government and privately-owned lines. The TGR timetables, both working and public, usually contained the timetables of the Emu Bay Railway (EBR) and the Mount Lyell Mining & Railway (MLMR) as well, to facilitate intersystem travel. The predecessors of the TGR, the LWR and the TMLR had their own methods and the TGR simply adopted them upon acquisition.

The sale of the system to the Commonwealth in 1974 at first produced very little change in the way things were done and the way timetables were prepared. The sale roughly coincided with the decision to withdraw metropolitan passenger rail services; country services were axed a few years after the

take over, leaving Tasmania with Australia's only freight-only system. Australian National produced periodic timetables to cover its Tasmanian operations as a separate Division from 1978 to 1995, latterly under the *Tasrail* banner- a trading name. These Working Timetables started out looking like those of their predecessor but eventually came to resemble those of the new parent body. Timetabling, which was a simple matter on what was by then a small and sparse system. This appears to have been carried out by the Launceston office, but it is hard to tell, because all information other than train times was stripped from what had previously been a most prolix document.

When the Brew Report recommendations were implemented in November 1997, the lease of the Tasmanian system was bought by *Australian Transport Network* (ATN), a

new subsidiary of Ed Burkhardt's Wisconsin Central system (one-third share) and New Zealand's Tranz Rail (two-thirds share). The actual land on which the tracks were laid was returned to the Tasmanian Government, which thereby became the lessor. Wisconsin Central, a former small USA operator was rapidly flexing its muscle in the 1990s and attempting to expand into a major system. It also bought the entire British rail freight network and the New Zealand Railways system. Ownership of the network was retained by Australian National. Six months after acquiring an interest in Tasrail, ATN Network acquired the Emu Bay Railway.

For a while, it looked like Tasmania might have a Wisconsin Central *Employee Time Table*, but this did not come to pass. ATN's timetabling practices remained firmly rooted in those of the system which

Working Timetable BURNIE To BOYER HOBART

READ DOWN							READ UP											
31 Sun-Fri	31 Sat	31 Sun	35 Sat	35 Sun	35 Mon-Fri	33 Mon-Fri		Km		Km		38 Mon-Sat		32 Sun-Fri	36 Mon-Fri	36 Sat		
								259.3	WILTSHIRE	259.3								
								Dep W		Dep W								
7:50	7:50		17:00	17:00	17:50	14:50		Arr 177.7	BURNIE	177.7	Dep							
9:05	9:05		18:15	18:15	19:05	16:05		Dep W		Dep W	10:35			4:41	7:03	5:48		
9:12	9:12		19:02	18:22	19:35	16:35		Arr 129.5	DEVONPORT	129.5	Dep	9:20		3:26	5:48	4:33		
9:42	9:42		19:32	18:52	20:05	17:05		Dep W		Dep W	7:55		3:19	5:03	4:03			
9:50	9:50		19:40	19:00	20:50	17:13		Arr 108.6	RAILTON	108.6	Dep	7:25		2:49	4:33	3:33		
								Dep W		Dep W	6:55			2:41	4:25	3:25		
10:50	10:50		20:40	20:00	21:50	18:13		Arr 72.5	DELORAINIE	72.5	Dep	5:55		1:41	3:25	2:25		
								Dep W		Dep W								
11:20	11:20		21:10	20:30	22:20	18:43		Arr 50.8	HAGLEY	50.8	Dep	5:25		1:11	2:55	1:55		
								Dep W		Dep W								
								Arr 28.6	LONGFORD	28.6	Dep							
								Dep W		Dep W								
12:10	12:10		22:00	21:20	23:10	19:33		Arr 199.2	WESTERN JCT	199.2	Dep	4:35		0:21	2:05	1:05		
12:19	12:19		22:30	0:10	1:10	20:05		Dep S		Dep S	3:35		23:56	0:53	0:25			
13:09	13:09		23:20	1:00	2:00	20:55		Arr 161.1	CONARA JCT	161.1	Dep	2:45		23:06	0:03	23:35		
13:24		13:24	23:35	1:08	2:40	21:10		Dep S		Dep S	1:55		22:51	23:55	23:16			
								Arr 122.1	TUNBRIDGE	122.1	Dep	1:05		22:01	23:05	22:26		
								Dep S		Dep S				22:58				
15:04		15:04	1:15	2:48	4:20	0:05		Arr 88.3	PARATTAH	88.3	Dep	0:15		21:11	22:08	21:36		
								Dep S		Dep S	23:55							
15:49		15:49	2:00	3:33	5:05	0:50		Arr 62.6	COLEBROOK	62.6	Dep	23:10		20:26	21:23	20:51		
								Dep S		Dep S				21:16				
								Arr 32.7	TEA TREE	32.7	Dep							
								Dep S		Dep S								
								Arr 24.5	ROGERVILLE	24.5	Dep	21:55						
								Dep S		Dep S	21:10							
17:09		17:09	3:20	4:53	6:55	2:10		Arr 21.5	BRIDGEWATER	21.5	Dep	21:05		19:06	19:56	19:31		
17:15		17:15	3:26	4:59	7:01	2:16		Dep S	JCT	S	Arr	14:30		19:00	19:50	19:26		
			4:06	5:39	7:41	2:56		Arr 0	HOBART	0	Dep	13:30			19:10	18:45		
17:35		17:35						Arr 14	BOYER	14	Dep			18:40				
								D	D	D								

G:\Ops\Timetable\Current Timetable 04-12-2003.xls

The way Pacific National does it in Tasmania. This is an Excel spreadsheet of the current Hobart-Burnie main line. This method of doing timetables was inherited from Australian Transport Network, who introduced it to replace the 'traditional' system used by ANR, who had thrown away the old TGR system.

it swallowed up. The Tasrail name was retained and timetable production were streamlined, with the timetables becoming Excel spreadsheets distributed electronically—paper copies vanished.

Burkhardt and Wisconsin Central rather quickly fell on hard times, Burkhardt was sacked and Wisconsin Central ownership passed to Canadian National in 2001. The Wisconsin Central one-third ownership share of ATN passed to two merchant banks, and Tranz Rail was bought out by Toll Holdings, but eventually passed back to the New Zealand Government. Despite this round-robin series of transactions, nothing much changed in Tas Rail's timetabling world, with new timetables, in the same Excel form being issued at about 6 monthly intervals

In February 2004, after considerable debate and legal challenge, Pacific National acquired 100% of ATN. The sale included Tasrail's 39 locomotives and 668 wagons and the 50-year lease of Tasmania's 780 km of rail track. At least one timetable has appeared since then, but it appears to follow the methods and conventions of those of ATN.

At all stages, the Tasmanian system seems to have retained its vertically integrated status. Although the land is owned by the Government, the whole shebang, including responsibility for access has been leased to the various entities that have had their finger in the pie over the last 10 years. There is, however, a notional commitment to the principles of NCP and there exists machinery at a Government level to oversee competitive access to the rail network. Access undertakings and bidding for timetable slots would theoretically be arranged with the lessee. It's just that nobody else seems bothered. All of the things that make rail uncompetitive are to the fore in Tasmania and it is a wonder that even one operator shows interest.

MELBOURNE — DIMBOOLA (Standard Gauge)								
V/Line Train Number	9785	9785	9785	9785	9785	9713	9713	
Aust. Train Number (See p.v)						5MP6	6MP6	
DOWN	Block Grain [Ety] 01 50 From Portland MSuO	Block Grain [Ety] 01 50 From Portland TuFO	Block Grain [Ety] 01 50 From Portland ThO	Block Grain [Ety] 01 50 From Portland WO	Block Grain [Ety] 01 50 From Portland SaO	Super-freighter To Perth ThO	Super-freighter To Perth FO	
Schedule speed	80/90	80/90	80/90	80/90	80/90	80/100	80/100	
T.R. Times						23 20	23 20	
SPENCER STREET dep.
NRC STEEL TERM. MELB. arr.
NRC FREIGHT TERM. MELB. dep.	00 20	00 20	..
NRC OPER. TERM. MELB. dep.
DYNON dep.
South Dynon Junction	00 25*	00 25*	..
West Footscray Junction	00 34*	00 34*	..
Tottenham Loop
Tottenham 'B' Box	00 37*	00 37*	..
Brooklyn	00 39*	00 39*	..
Newport	00 45*	00 45*	..
Galvin Block Point	00 53D	00 53D	..
Manor Loop	00 55	00 55	..
Elders Block Point	01 01*	01 01*	..
North Geelong C Block Point	-9792	-9792	..
Gheringhap Loop	01 22D	01 22D	..
Hesse Block Point	01 42*	01 42*	..
Inverleigh
Wingee Loop	01 48*	01 48*	..
Werneth Block Point	02 04*	02 04*	..
Berrybank Loop	02 14*	02 14*	..
Toolil Block Point	02 34-9712	03 05-9712	..
Vite Vite Loop	03 20	03 20	..
Fiery Creek Block Point	03 36*	03 36*	..
Westmere	04 04*	04 04*	..
Talyoon Loop	04 24-8702	04 24-8702	..
ARARAT	05 00	05 00	..
Jacksons Block Point	05 18*	05 18*	..
ARARAT	05 44*	05 44*	..
Pyrenees Loop	arr. 04 30D	04 45D	04 45D	04 45D	04 45D	-9702	-9702	..
Great Western Loop	dep. 04 40	04 50	04 50	05 05	05 05	05 54*	05 54*	..
Stawell	dep. 04 47*	04 57*	04 57*	05 12*	05 12*	06 04*	06 04*	..
Deep Lead Loop	arr. 04 54*	05 04*	05 04*	05 19*	05 19*	06 12*	06 12*	..
Glenorchy	arr. -9702	-9702	-9702	-9702	-9702	06 20*	06 20*	..
Lubeck Loop	dep. 05 00*	05 10*	05 10*	05 25*	05 25*	06 20*	06 20*	..
Marmalake	arr. 05 20*	05 30*	05 30*	05 45*	05 58	06 38*	06 38*	..
Murtoa	arr. 05 30*	05 40*	05 40*	05 55*	06 08	06 48*	06 48*	..
Murtoa Loop	arr. 05 39*	05 49*	05 49*	06 04	06 17*	06 58*	06 58*	..
Jung	arr. 05 00*	06 10*	06 25*	06 25*	06 37*	-9752	-9752	..
Dooen	arr. 06 00*	06 10*	06 25*	06 25*	06 37*	07 20*	07 18*	..
Horsham	arr. 06 15G	06 25G	06 40G	06 40G	06 50G	-9722	-9722	..
Dahlien	arr. 06 30*	06 40*	06 55*	07 10*	07 23*	07 32*	07 30*	..
Pimpinio Loop	arr. 06 30*	06 40*	06 55*	07 10*	07 23*	07 36*	07 36*	..
Wail	arr. 06 30*	06 40*	06 55*	07 10*	07 23*	07 36*	07 36*	..
DIMBOOLA	arr. 06 30*	06 40*	06 55*	07 10*	07 23*	07 36*	07 36*	..
	dep. 08 25D	08 30	08 30	08 30	08 30	08 25D	08 22D	..
						08 30	08 28	..
						To p.50A	To p.50A	..

G — Continues to destinations beyond Murtoa/Dimboola as arranged by Manager, Grain Operations.

p.44a

Effective: 20.12.96
Replaces: 13.10.96

The Melbourne end of the Perth Connection. Australia's first privately-operated multi-system freight train was SCT's Melbourne-Perth Super-Freighter, shown in this V/Line Master Train Plan as #9713 or, in its NRC disguise, as _MP6

